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Britain’s economic outlook after Brexit 
In a historic referendum, Britain has voted to leave the European Union. Some of the polling 
suggests that a backlash against globalisation played a role, alongside themes such as 
sovereignty and immigration. The government has insisted that Britain will maintain its 
global outlook, but how challenging will that be in the face of disengaging from the world’s 
biggest economic entity and forging a novel path? The UK is doing so with some notable 
weaknesses in its large trade deficit. This article explores the economic uncertainties of 
Brexit and potential ways forward.  
 
1. Introduction 
In a historic referendum, Britain has voted to leave the European Union. Some of the polling 
suggests that a backlash against globalisation played a role in what has been dubbed Brexit, 
alongside issues such as sovereignty and immigration. The government has insisted that 
Britain will maintain its global outlook, but how challenging will that be in the face of 
disengaging from the world’s biggest economic entity while forging a new path? The UK is 
doing so with some notable weaknesses in its large trade deficit, which has hit a record high 
after its 2008 financial crisis. 
What does the economic future hold for Britain? Of course, the dust has not yet settled, as 
there are a lot of unknowns facing the first country to leave the European Union. There is no 
question that the decisions to be taken will involve re-defining Britain’s trade relationship 
not only with the EU but the rest of the world – for years to come. This article explores the 
economic uncertainties of Brexit and potential ways forward.  
2. The economic impact of Brexit 
Some hiring and investment decisions had been delayed even before the vote on June 23rd, 
2016; in fact, since the announcement of the referendum on whether the UK will remain or 
leave the EU was made by the British government (Economic Policy Uncertainty, 2016). 
Investors’ expectation of Sterling volatility before the EU referendum was the highest since 
the 2008 financial crisis when the entire banking system could have brought the economy 
down. The market reaction reflected uncertainty about what will happen to the Pound, 
which dropped sharply as predicted after the UK voted to leave the EU.  
Investors appear to be placing their money on just one outcome - a hit to the economy 
regardless of the referendum result. That was reflected in gilt yields, the interest rate that 
the UK pays on its government bonds, which had fallen even before the referendum vote. 
Since the referendum outcome, yields on benchmark 10 year government debt had fallen to 
record lows as have those on 20 and 30 year debt.  
Bond yields reflect where markets expect interest rates to be, which is affected by the Bank 
of England base rate and the state of the economy. And those are related. If the economy is 
contracting or weak, the Bank of England would be expected to cut rates. Indeed, that is 
what has happened as the BOE cut interest rates just a couple of months after Brexit to a 
record low 0.25%. It’s the first time that the central bank has cut rates and also extended 
quantitative easing since the 2009 recession that followed the banking crash. QE was not 
  
only revived, it was also expanded as the BOE announced it would for the first time also 
purchase corporate debt as part of its programme. 
Conversely, bond yields are also influenced by the world economy which in turn affects 
Britain. The global outlook doesn’t look too rosy either. Worldwide, developed economies’ 
government bond yields have dropped dramatically. Slow growth and aggressive easing by 
central banks, along with Brexit for the UK, are among the factors driving real yields lower. 
A lower interest rate in the future signals that investors are concerned about a weaker 
economy. But, they are not concerned about the ability of the British governments to pay its 
debt, which would send yields higher. Confidence in the government alone of course 
doesn't move yields on longer-term debt as much as interest rates, economic growth, and 
inflation. 
As Britain voted to leave on June 23rd, there will be at least two years of uncertainty, which 
is the period allowed under Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty to negotiate a new relationship 
with the EU. Uncertainty tends to dampen economic activity (Baker, Bloom, and Davis, 
2015). Investors may or may not be getting it right, but uncertainty tends to make 
businesses cautious. And, for the economy, that tends to mean being conservative about 
where it’s headed. 
Amidst the uncertainty around what will happen after Britain’s historic vote to leave the 
European Union, there is some clarity about the next steps. The basic trade-off is between 
remaining within the Single Market and wresting back control, notably over migration. 
The European Union, though, views the freedom of movement of people as one of the four 
pillars of the Single Market (the others being the free movement of capital, goods, services), 
which grants the right to people within it to live and work freely anywhere in the EU. In 
other words, as a member of the EU Single Market, Brits have the right to live and work in 
the EU just as those from the EU have the same rights to live and work in the UK. 
Is it possible to retain access to the European market but not be subject to EU laws, 
including the freedom of movement of people? So far, the EU hasn’t granted that to the 
non-EU countries which have negotiated the right to access the Single Market. 
There are three countries in the European Free Trade Association (Norway, Liechtenstein, 
Iceland) plus Switzerland, which also has unfettered access to the Single Market via a series 
of treaties. All accept freedom of movement of people in principle in exchange for their 
varying degrees of access to the largest economic bloc in the world. For the very small 
nation of Liechtenstein with a tiny population of 36,000, they have been allowed to retain 
an immigration quota to be reviewed every five years. Thus, the free movement of people is 
described by EFTA as “perhaps the most important right for individuals, as it gives citizens of 
the 31 EEA countries [EU plus these three countries] the opportunity to live, work, establish 
business and study in any of these countries” (EFTA, 2016). 
To give a sense as to how integral free movement of people is, Switzerland’s two year 
struggle to impose a quota on EU migrants is telling. In February 2014, the Swiss voted in a 
referendum for controls on EU migration. But the EU wouldn’t budge on the principle of the 
freedom of movement of people, so the negotiations have dragged on with no conclusion. 
Ironically, they are exploring the possibility of using the “emergency brake” that the former 
  
British Prime Minister David Cameron had negotiated prior to the EU referendum in the UK 
that would have restricted in-work benefits for new migrants and potentially lessened the 
“pull factor” of economic migration to a higher income country. 
Remaining in the European Single Market has also been touted by a range of businesses and 
policymakers, including the Mayor of London, as being crucial in Britain’s future relationship 
with the EU. Not all Leave campaigners may agree, of course, since some had advocated 
leaving the Single Market and just having a free trade agreement (FTA) with the EU. A FTA 
wouldn’t confer the right to live, study, and work in the EU, so it remains to be seen what 
can be delivered. 
It is important to note that the Single Market is much more than a free trade agreement. By 
applying the same rules and standards on goods and services, it frees up trade and 
investment in ways that allows a business to treat the half a billion people in the EU as 
a single market for their business. So, it is not about tariffs but what economists call non-
tariff barriers (NTBs) that matter in some instances more, especially for small businesses 
where the ease of selling across borders can be heavily affected by standards and rules 
(Breinlich et al., 2016). And, for businesses, small and large, the European market is 
important. 
The Institute of Directors based in London surveyed its members right after Brexit. Of the 
1,092 UK firms, a quarter were freezing recruitment, some 20% were considering moving 
their operations abroad, and 5% even said redundancies were possible. This reaction 
reflects the uncertainty that has been seen most vividly in markets, but also importantly for 
the economy, the big question marks over the UK’s future relationship with Europe. 
It may well be that the cost of gaining access to the Single Market is considered by the 
policymakers to be too great if it means accepting the free movement of people. Of course, 
it’s not just immigration policy. Like the other non-EU countries that have free access the 
Single Market, the UK will also have to accept the rules set by Brussels. And that may well be 
unacceptable as some in the Leave camp also campaigned on the basis that Britain will no 
longer be governed by EU laws. But, that is the unavoidable trade-off: unfettered access to 
the EU Single Market versus control over migration. 
Now, if the UK were to gain some, but not full, access to the Single Market, would the EU be 
willing to permit the UK to retain control over migration and compromise one of its 
fundamental principles? And what would that look like? Would other EU countries want the 
same deal or threaten to leave? 
The EU hasn’t so far granted any such “Single Market-lite” to a major country, but there are 
those who have argued that Britain is a more important economy than Switzerland or 
Norway, etc., so the EU will want to sell to the UK and offer more concessions. 
On the other side, there are others who insist that granting Britain the benefits of the Single 
Market without the free movement of people is setting the wrong example for other EU 
countries who may also want to control migration and leave too. A break-up of the 
European Union is an outcome the EU leaders certainly want to avoid. There is no doubt 
that this is a challenging trade-off with a lot at stake for the economy. There is also a lot at 
  
stake for Europe, which has to negotiate Brexit which will affect how it reforms its own 
institutions.  
3. Europe's economic paths 
Brexit was a seismic political event. But, there have been rumblings across Europe, which 
highlights the challenge of negotiating with an economic bloc that is still in the process of 
formation and subject to some of the same anti-globalisation pressures seen in the UK. 
The French prime minister has described the votes won by the far-right National Front and 
Eurosceptic parties as a "political earthquake." The gains made by anti-EU and anti-euro 
parties in the last European elections in countries ranging from Denmark to Greece have 
generated debate over the European project and Europe's economic future.  
But, the pro-Europe mainstream parties — the centre-right European People's Party (EPP) 
and the centre-left Socialists and Democrats (S&D) -- retain a majority. They had worked 
toward further integration that had been challenged during the euro crisis that erupted in 
May 2010 when Greece was rescued. 
For some time, the growing influence of Brussels has led to debates over the 'democratic 
deficit.' Now, we have a glimpse of the views of voters, which policymaker will need to take 
heed of as they shape the emerging institutions of the Euro Zone. 
The European Union has already changed a great deal. The EU began as the European Coal 
Community after WWII, latterly expanded to include the UK which joined in 1973 (Venables, 
Winters, and Yueh, 2008). The motives were political to tie together nations previously at 
war, but became an economic entity – the European Union – and in fact, the biggest 
economic unit in the world, larger than the United States both in terms of output and 
population.  
The creation of the single currency in 1999 split the EU into euro zone countries and the rest 
– though all of the remaining non-euro EU countries with the exceptions of Denmark and 
the UK are slated to join the euro in the coming years.  
After the eruption of the Greek crisis in 2010, the reaction from Euro Zone leaders was 
'more Europe.'   
The ensuing euro crisis which saw other countries get rescued in addition to Greece 
revealed the fragility of a monetary union without a banking union as banks had lent large 
amounts to peripheral countries such as Ireland. Rescuing the banks led to the need for 
Ireland itself to be rescued. So, a banking union has since been created but it has also raised 
operational questions for non-euro EU countries like Sweden with large banking systems. 
That wasn't the only institution that was seen to be lacking. Euro Zone leaders reinforced 
the need for member countries to have fiscal discipline. Before the crisis, Greece borrowed 
at the same rates as Germany, as bond markets seemed to view the Euro Zone as one 
entity. That contributed to too much borrowing. Though that is unlikely to happen in the 
future, Euro Zone leaders came up with additional reforms to try and enforce fiscal 
restraint. The outcome was the European semester, where there was greater monitoring of 
national budgets by Brussels to ensure that countries that shared a currency didn't run large 
  
deficits.  
These developments continued the transfer of economic decisionmaking power toward 
supra-national bodies. For instance, other institutions that were created include the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) that gave the Frankfurt-based European Central Bank (ECB) 
more powers to oversee banks and the establishment of the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM), a permanent rescue fund that is like a European IMF based in Luxembourg. 
For economists, the euro crisis raised the prospect of euro break-up. Economists have 
wondered whether the peripheral countries belonged to the same 'optimal currency area' 
or OCA as Germany and its northern European neighbours (Krugman, 2013). In other words, 
should all euro countries -- including the EU countries that are slated to accede -- share a 
currency? Have the criteria of trade integration and convergence in business cycles and 
incomes been met? European countries trade a great deal with each other but convergence 
is a different matter. If a country isn't converging with the rest of the member countries, 
then it is a high cost to lose control over its interest rate and currency. Could reforming the 
euro institutions improve the prospects of convergence?  
There is a middle path — an European single market that doesn't share a single currency. 
Deeper integration and linking markets could happen, but without giving up a country's 
currency. Britain, Denmark, and the other non-euro EU countries are examples of those who 
operate in a shared market but retain their own currencies. This is an old debate that has 
come to the forefront, particularly for those outside the single currency that have watched 
the euro crisis.  
Indeed, the deep integration of the European Single Market goes beyond a free trade area, 
which is what the U.S. has with Canada and Mexico in NAFTA (North America Free Trade 
Area). The Single Market eliminates not just tariffs, but non-tariff barriers. Common 
standards enables a firm located in the Single Market to sell anywhere within it as if it were 
a domestic market. For small countries in particular, that advantage allows its firms to gain 
economies of scale when competing against multinationals from America and China which 
count huge domestic customers as their home market.  
This is why the debate over Britain’s continuing access to the Single Market is such an acute 
one. But, as mentioned before, free access to the Single Market appears to require the 
acceptance of free movement of people which is the antithesis of the Brexit vote seeking to 
wrest back control over migration. 
Undoubtedly, the rise of both anti-EU and Eurosceptic parties will lead to debates on all 
these possible paths for the European Union. Upcoming elections in major European 
countries won't be determinative, but the economic future of the European project will 
surely be discussed in the coming years. 
As Europe continues to evolve, Britain’s exit from the EU will be tricky as the political 
landscape shifts on the continent. 
So, as the UK contemplates its future with Europe, what’s needed now is a parallel pursuit 
of free trade agreements with the other major economies.  
4. Britain’s future outside of Europe 
  
Having free trade agreements with the world’s biggest economies certainly would be 
important for Britain. Global trade is far from free, so negotiating market access for trade 
and investment for British businesses is important, especially if the UK is to retain its 
international outlook that has contributed to its economic growth and position as the 
world’s fifth biggest economy.  
The European Single Market’s deep integration eliminates non-tariff barriers through 
common standards. A vast market on Britain’s doorstep is certainly economically valuable 
and should be a priority for a new FTA after Brexit. The UK has a lot of negotiating to do 
there as discussed earlier. But Britain should also be actively securing its place on the world 
stage through pursuing trade agreements with the other major economies while it sorts out 
its future with the EU. 
Trade agreements take years, as will Britain’s negotiations with the European Union, so the 
sensible approach is to start informal talks with the U.S., China, and Japan, among others. Of 
course, there are other trade partners to consider too, but focusing on the world’s biggest 
economies (U.S., China, Japan) and the EU is a good start. Among the often-overlooked is 
the Commonwealth, with which trade relations will have to be renegotiated too.  
Trade agreements are being pursued by other countries seeking to open up markets and 
raise economic growth. There is more attention than ever being paid to new and potential 
trade deals such as those led by China (RCEP or Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership), TPP (Trans Pacific Partnership) between America and Asia, and TTIP (Trans-
Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) between the U.S. and Europe.  
These are led by China and the U.S., so the UK would do well to start parallel talks with the 
world’s biggest economies. Indeed, the Republican Speaker of the House of Representatives 
of the U.S. Congress has said that he is interested in starting negotiations with Britain as it 
negotiates Brexit.  
Similarly, pursuing a free trade deal with China, the world’s second largest economy, should 
be a priority too. The UK may be at risk of looking less attractive as a gateway to Europe, but 
that depends on the EU negotiations. In the meanwhile, it would be sensible to build on the 
existing strong links between Britain and China to secure a free trade agreement. 
In many respects, Britain and China have complementary strengths and needs in their 
economies. China is seeking expertise in services and high tech industry, which Britain can 
offer. Britain needs to maintain sizeable investment inflows due to its persistent and large 
current account deficit, which is what China’s outward investment push offers. Unlike the 
EU, which has a larger industry and agricultural sector to consider, the UK is in a comparably 
better position to agree on a FTA with China. Of course, the detail and protection of losers 
from globalisation will matter, as well as a range of other political considerations.  
China is a tough negotiating partner and has few FTAs. This is also a challenging time for 
China as it focuses on aligning external with internal priorities around reforming its slowing 
economy. In any case, having one or at least moving towards a FTA with China would also 
help with Britain’s negotiations with the EU if the UK can become the gateway to over a 
billion Chinese customers for EU businesses. 
  
The same rationale of securing FTAs applies to other major economies, such as the world’s 
third biggest economy, Japan.  
There is, though, one grouping that is worth highlighting. It hasn’t gotten as much attention, 
but the Commonwealth is a network that Britain is well placed to pursue more trade with. 
After all, economic studies consistently show that among the determinants of greater trade 
are historical ties, shared language and institutions (Makino and Tsang, 2011). The 52 
nations of the Commonwealth have that largely overlooked advantage.  
Trade among these nations, which range from the rich such as Britain and Singapore to the 
poorer ones in Africa, has been growing rapidly. Even without being a formal trade bloc, 
intra-Commonwealth trade was estimated at $592 billion in 2013 and is forecast to surpass 
$1 trillion by 2020 by the Commonwealth Secretariat.  
That’s due to the rapid economic growth, including in trade in these countries, in the past 
few years. Since 2000, global exports of Commonwealth countries have nearly tripled from 
$1.3 trillion to $3.4 trillion, accounting for 14.6% of world exports in 2013. In other words, if 
it were one economic entity, the Commonwealth would be the world’s largest trader, 
surpassing China.  
But, it must be noted that just six Commonwealth countries account for 84% of 
Commonwealth trade: Australia, Canada, India, Malaysia, and Singapore as well as Britain 
itself. So, these five nations are partners for Britain to focus on, which it can do more 
efficiently by turning its attention to the Commonwealth. There are also yet untapped 
smaller export markets, including some of the fastest growing economies in Asia and Africa. 
A shift in UK trade has already been quietly happening. The current and previous 
governments have sought to develop greater links with faster growing emerging economies. 
For instance, in 1999, 55% of exports were to the EU. Now, the UK exports roughly more to 
non-EU countries than to the EU. Britain’s trade with the Commonwealth is less than one-
quarter of that of the EU, so there’s room to grow. 
Certainly, the faster economic growth of Commonwealth countries offers greater 
opportunities than before. In terms of share of global GDP, the Commonwealth overtook 
the European Union in 2010. A lot has to do with demography. The United Nations 
estimates that population growth in the Commonwealth is expected to increase by 29.4% 
until 2020, while the Eurozone is expected to fall by 1.4%. 
Finally, it’s worth recalling in 1973, the UK had to end special trade ties with the 
Commonwealth because it joined the EU, which is a customs union that has common trade 
rules with the rest of the world. That won’t be a constraint after Brexit.  
With a combined population of 2.3 billion across six continents, many of them faster 
growing than the rich economies of the West, fostering greater trade and investment links 
with the Commonwealth could prove to be helpful. 
The rest of the world is also pushing for more free trade agreements, despite the concerns 
over economic globalization. The next section reviews the rapid growth of FTAs around the 
world and what it means for post-Brexit Britain. 
  
5. The global push for free trade areas 
What’s happening around the world in terms of existing free trade deals that are in the 
works is an important shift in global context. In different regions around the world, there’s a 
noteworthy push for free trade areas that reduce tariffs and adopt other measures to ease 
trade and investment. Of course, the election of Donald Trump adds uncertainty to 
America’s push, but the rest of the world, notably China, are keenly pursuing regional and 
bilateral trade agreements not only encompassing goods but also services and investment. 
First, a reminder of what tariffs encompass and why they are economically inefficient: 
Tariffs are the charges that governments impose on imports and exports. They are a tax so 
where they are imposed, they can distort the prices of goods and services. Because tariffs 
add a cost and thus reduce economic efficiency, they can be a drag on growth. So, free trade 
areas aim to eliminate most of them. Of course, a number of governments use them to 
protect their industries from competition from big global companies until they are more 
mature. Labour groups also want protection for domestic jobs. It's a messy area.  
There are also NTBs (non-tariff barriers) to add to the mix. These are the other ways to be 
protectionist without imposing tariffs, such as through standards for certain industries that 
can restrict imports. For instance, Thai prawn exporters found it hard to meet American 
standards for the type of net that allowed them to sell to the U.S.  
Indeed, the still to be ratified Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) would be the world’s biggest 
free trade area that links North America with parts of Latin America and Asia. The Americans 
had hoped to gain from this new free trade area since 61% of US goods exports and 75% of 
U.S. agricultural exports go to the Asia Pacific region. The TPP would allow partner 
countries to access the world’s largest market in return by reducing (perhaps eventually 
eliminating) the tariffs they would have to pay to export to the USA. 
President Obama has been re-orienting to fast growing Asia, as part of his wider foreign 
policy shift. Obama’s “Asia pivot” could be viewed as a counter-balance to China's economic 
and strategic impact that stretches from the North China Sea to the Persian Gulf.  But, it’s 
hard for the U.S. to re-orient away from the Middle East and Russia, and it’s certainly 
unclear what a Trump administration will do in terms of foreign and trade policy. 
In any case, Europe is also pursuing an equally ambitious free trade agreement with 
America. The TTIP is the trans-Atlantic FTA which would link the U.S. with the EU, which will 
eventually exclude Britain, if it came into force. 
The rise of these massive regional FTAs is also a reaction to the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) expansion stalling. After all, it has been well over a decade since the last big WTO 
initiative – the Doha Round - was launched and there are not many signs of significant 
progress. 
Instead of trying to get to a deal with almost the entire world, these regional trade 
agreements have sprung up. Bilateral agreements too fill the void. It would be better for all 
countries to trade on equal terms with all others, but a multilateral trade deal under the 
WTO has stalled so countries are going for second best options such as regional trade 
agreements. 
  
The problem with this approach is that if a country hasn’t signed up to the rules (or hasn’t 
even been invited to join) for any of the new free trade areas, it’s excluded and can’t share 
the benefits. This is a prospect that Britain will face but that China is also confronted with. 
Being left out of TPP and the TTIP means China is doing its own thing. China is negotiating 
with ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) to form its own regional free trade 
agreement. China is also offering to set up a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) in 
reaction to President-elect Trump saying that the U.S. will pull out of TPP. 
These regional FTAs are not the best outcome but perhaps it’s better than not having any 
new trade deals. The result is the potential creation of sizeable free trade areas where 
domestic companies can gain economies of scale by selling to a much larger customer base 
than otherwise. The competitive advantage to be gained is potentially sizeable. 
That’s why Southeast Asia is also pursuing an ambitious free trade area. But, the single 
market that the 10 nations of Southeast Asia (ASEAN) launched at the end of 2015 will not 
include a single currency. The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) also won’t have an 
equivalent of the European Central Bank in the foreseeable future. 
The ASEAN single market rivals the EU in terms of population. With over 600 million people, 
ASEAN links together 10 countries ranging from rich Singapore to poor Laos into a free trade 
area with free movement of labour, removal of tariffs, and common standards.  
The AEC is even aiming to rival the EU and perhaps overtake it by 2020 based on the 5% plus 
economic growth rate of ASEAN as compared to the 1-2% growth of the EU.  
Still, there are numerous challenges facing the AEC. There aren’t many pan-regional 
institutions, for one. There is also no comparable European Commission for the AEC. The 
AEC also lacks institutions to protect human rights and workers, including a court like the 
European Court of Justice. That will be challenging as political differences in the region, 
including non-democratic states, will make it tough to integrate politically as well as socially. 
Those are unsurprising the other two pillars of the AEC, which mirrors the development of 
European institutions since tying markets together requires more than just economic 
agreements. 
Besides institutions, the region also faces challenges in terms of what economists call 
“deep” integration so NTBs aren’t typically removed, for instance (Baldwin, 2008). There are 
many trade links in the region, but intra-regional trade in ASEAN is only around a quarter of 
total trade as compared with the EU or in particular the euro zone where the biggest trade 
partners are the other economies in Europe. Trade has increased in the past few decades in 
Southeast Asia, but it’s non-tariff barriers that protect some home industries that remain 
barriers. 
ASEAN policymakers emphasise that the impetus behind the AEC is to compete with the 
sizeable markets of the EU, U.S. as well as neighbouring China and India. The rise of regional 
free trade agreements being negotiated such as the TPP linking America to Asia, and TTIP 
tying the U.S. to the EU, highlight the urgency for Southeast Asia to link their economies to 
compete. 
With twice the population of the United States and one that is similar to the scale of the EU, 
the AEC has potential to become one of the largest economic entities in the world. We’ll 
  
soon see if the AEC becomes a common reference point for the rest of the world like the EU 
is and a market like the U.S. that global businesses have to be in. It seems that Southeast 
Asians certainly have that ambition. 
So, within this context of countries joining regional FTAs, Britain is rather unusually leaving 
one and embarking on bilateral trade deals. The question is whether Britain will be 
successful going at it alone outside the EU. But, Britain does have a long track record of 
benefitting from its global outlook. 
6. Britain’s long-standing international orientation  
Britain is 'open for business' is the message that has been sent by successive UK 
governments, particularly after Brexit.  
It is already the case that many British brands are foreign-owned. The stock of foreign direct 
investment in the UK is around half of GDP, which is appreciably higher than the global 
average of one-third. But, it is a two-way street: The UK has its share of global companies 
and makes a tidy return from overseas investments. 
In recent years, many of Britain’s iconic brand names have been snapped up by foreign 
companies. The car industry is a particularly good example. Britain’s most prestigious 
marques, Rolls Royce and Bentley, have been respectively owned by BMW and Volkswagen 
since 1998. Four years earlier, BMW had acquired the ailing Rover group. Unable to turn it 
around they broke it up in 2000 only keeping the Mini which has proved to be a commercial 
success. Ford bought Land Rover while MG Rover was sold first to the Phoenix Consortium 
before being rescued from administration by China’s Nanjing Automobile Group in 2005. 
Ford had purchased Jaguar in 1990, but sold it along with Land Rover to India’s Tata Motors 
in 2008. 
Aston Martin, however, is back in British hands. The Oxfordshire-based Prodrive led a 
consortium which bought the company from Ford in 2007. However, Ford maintained a 10% 
stake and the financing for the deal mainly came from U.S. and Kuwaiti backers. Later on, 
37.5% was sold to an Italian private equity company. 
Such is the way with big business today. A company from somewhere might be owned by 
another company from somewhere else, whose investors in turn come from all around the 
world. It makes the question of ownership hard to pin down. 
A survey conducted by the trade magazine The Grocer and the research firm Nielsen found 
that of the biggest 150 biggest grocery brands in the UK just 44 are domestically-owned. 
And of the 91 brands created in the UK, only 36 were still owned by British companies. The 
rest are owned by foreign multinationals and private equity groups. 
This follows a series of high profile takeovers of famous British brands. HP brown sauce was 
the inspiration of Frederick Gibson Garton, a Nottingham grocer in the late 19th Century. It 
was so-called after he learned of it being consumed in the Houses of Parliament. In June 
2005 the brand became part of the Heinz empire. And to show what goes around comes 
around, Heinz itself was purchased earlier this year by Warren Buffet’s Berkshire Hathaway 
and the Brazilian global investment fund 3G Capital. 
  
The Chinese company Bright Foods took a controlling 60% stake in Weetabix Ltd, which also 
owned the Alpen and Ready-Brek brands. Branston Pickle, of which 28 million jars are sold 
every year in the UK, was acquired by the Japanese firm Mizkan who, by the way, already 
own Sarsons Vinegar and Hayward’s Pickled Onions. 
Cadbury, founded in Birmingham in 1824, was bought by the American Kraft Foods in 2010. 
It was then spun off into Mondelez International, Kraft group’s international snack and 
confectionary business. Britain’s other large confectioner Rowntree Mackintosh, founded in 
York in 1862, had been bought by the Swiss conglomerate Nestle in 1988 only one year after 
becoming a public company. 
In 2008, the alcoholic drinks company Scottish & Newcastle was jointly purchased by 
Heineken of The Netherlands and Carlsberg of Denmark. Traditionally British brews such as 
Newcastle Brown Ale, John Smiths Bitter and Strongbow Cider are now part of Heineken UK, 
so basically owned by the Dutch. 
One of the clear trends is that international brands are becoming increasingly owned by a 
small number of very large conglomerates. For instance, Pepsico, Coca-Cola, Kraft, Nestle, 
Mars, Procter & Gamble, and Unilever own a staggering number of the world’s most 
recognisable brands between them. Unilever, the Anglo-Dutch conglomerate, owns over 
400 brands by itself. 
This goes to show that big business increasingly dominates the global landscape. But it is 
also the case that Britain has a number of its own global titans. When it comes to 
acquisitions involving British and foreign companies is not just a one-way street. 
Indeed, it’s a two way street. Guinness is synonymous with Dublin and Ireland. Smirnoff 
originated from a Moscow distillery in the 1860s and is now one of the best-selling brands of 
vodka around the world. Both brands are owned by Diageo, a British company listed on the 
London FTSE and headquartered in London. The company also owns 34% of Moet Hennessy. 
This means that iconic French champagne brands Moet & Chandon and Veuve Cliquot, as 
well as Hennessy cognac are a third-owned by a British company. 
Britain has plenty of big companies that have expanded aggressively around the world. 
Vodafone is the second largest mobile phone company in the world in terms of numbers of 
subscribers with a presence in over 70 countries. Only China Mobile, with its large captive 
market, has more. The group has gobbled up plenty of its foreign rivals and often rebranded 
them as Vodafone along the way. 
In 2000, Vodafone bought the German company Mannesmann for £112 billion. At the time, 
this was the largest corporate merger and is still the largest by some considerable distance 
in UK corporate history. The deal caused unrest in Germany as never before had such a large 
company been acquired by a foreign owner. Further disquiet was caused when Vodafone 
reneged on a pre-merger deal to maintain the Mannessman brand and rebranded the 
company Vodafone D2. 
Tesco is the third largest retailer in the world after Walmart and Carrefour. It has as many 
outlets outside the UK as it does within it, with operations in 14 countries across Europe, 
Asia, and North America. Tesco has already been in China for nearly a decade where it has 
  
over 100 stores. 
But Britain’s really big beasts are in oil and finance. BP, formerly British Petroleum, started 
life as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1909 to manage the empire's oil discoveries in Iran. 
It now has operations in over 80 countries and is the second largest producer of oil and 
natural gas in the US. In 2008, it merged with Amoco and largely rebranded their U.S. 
operations as their own. 
Shell is an Anglo-Dutch company with operations in over 100 countries. According to the 
Fortune Global 500 list, which ranks firms in terms of revenue, it is the largest company in 
the world ahead of Wal-Mart. 
Plus, British banks and insurance companies are massive players on the world stage. 
Britain’s biggest bank is HSBC, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. It's also 
the second largest bank in the world in terms of assets held only after the Chinese state-
owned Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). It was founded in Hong Kong in 1865 
as the British Empire expanded trade into China. It essentially became a British bank in the 
early 1990s. The takeover of Midland Bank was conditioned on it moving its headquarters to 
London that was part of the calculus in any case as the handover of Hong Kong back to 
China loomed then. However, it remains predominantly a global bank with subsidiaries and 
operations in over 80 countries. 
Standard Chartered is Britain’s fifth biggest bank. It operates in over 70 countries but has no 
retail business in the UK. In fact, most British people would have never heard of the bank if 
it did not currently sponsor Liverpool football club. This makes sense given the popularity of 
the English Premier League in its key overseas markets. 90% of its profits come from Africa, 
Asia and the Middle East. It is a good example of a British company with a stronger presence 
overseas than at home.  
The Office for National Statistics (ONS) estimates that over half the shares in quoted UK 
companies are owned by foreign investors. Ten years ago only, a third of the shares were 
foreign owned and 20 years ago the proportion was only 13%. 
It’s evident that British companies have been attractive to foreign buyers and the UK has 
been open to overseas investors. This long-standing openness to global business is what the 
UK government has been promoting in order to convince businesses that it remains open 
for business after the Brexit vote. 
So why have British companies been attractive to overseas buyers? 
Perhaps it is because they are relatively easy to buy? A higher proportion of companies are 
publically listed so the shares can be bought and sold freely. Furthermore, fewer British 
firms are controlled by family trusts than in the U.S. and Europe. These can form powerful 
controlling groups that make direct takeovers difficult if the family does not want to sell. 
The British government rarely blocks deals even if there is a ‘strategic’ argument for doing 
so. The privatisation programmes starting in the 1980s has made many utility and 
infrastructure companies PLCs and foreigners are free to buy shares. Four of the big six 
energy companies, including most of the nuclear industry, are foreign owned. The same 
  
goes for British seaports, airports and railways. 
And since the Brexit vote, the fall in the value of the pound has made British companies 
cheaper to acquire. 
When foreigners buy shares in or takeover a British company, the profits and dividend 
payments are transferred overseas. There is a suspicion that these earnings are enhanced 
by outsourcing jobs to cheaper parts of the world and re-routing profits through 
jurisdictions with lower tax rates. Thus, there is a recent push for tax reform and the 
government wants to publish a roster of ownership. 
However, foreign ownership may also bring benefits. Foreign-owned plants are found to be 
on average more productive than domestically-owned establishments (Bloom, Sadun, and 
Van Reenen, 2012). Multinationals can bring fresh ideas and expertise, such as new 
technologies and management practices. The same goes for British multinationals setting up 
in foreign countries. 
The Spanish bank Santander already owned the Abbey National but there were few 
complaints in 2010 when it absorbed the Bradford & Bingley and the Alliance & Leicester 
building societies to become one of the largest UK retail banks. At the time there was 
considerable relief it was prepared to use its balance sheet to avert two further potential 
Northern Rocks. Foreign investment is unsurprisingly welcomed when there is a need for 
cash. 
In any case, Britain still owns far more direct investment assets overseas than vice versa. 
The ONS estimates that Britain has £1.1 trillion direct investment assets overseas, £300 
billion more than the rest of the world owns in the UK. 
Britain also typically enjoys a surplus in investment income. Since 2000, inflows of 
investment income have averaged 13.5% of GDP compared to outflows, which have 
averaged 12.4% of GDP. This means each year Britain has received a net flow of investment 
income equal to 1.1% of GDP from the rest of the world. 
Such capital inflows are of course essential to continue to finance Britain’s significant 
current account deficit. It’s the reason why the British government is so keen to stress the 
country’s long-standing openness to investment from around the world. And that leaving 
the European Union does not change its openness. It does have a long track record to draw 
upon, and the UK government is indeed touting its openness in order to convince the rest of 
the world that the Brexit vote is not leading to greater protectionism. 
7. Post-Brexit path forward for the UK 
Few things are as uncertain as Britain’s economic relationships in the years ahead. Still, one 
important factor will be attitudes towards globalisation and if that affects the UK’s ability to 
maintain its global outlook. 
It is one of the issues that its major trading partners will be looking for, given the perception 
that Britain has turned inward by leaving the EU. The UK government, though, has focused 
on maintaining the country’s long-standing international outlook. 
  
The tussle between the UK and China is an example of the uncertainty going forward. The 
new British government under Prime Minister Theresa May had wanted to re-consider the 
agreement to build the Hinkley Point nuclear plant that is financed by the French company 
EDF and China. It became a flashpoint for where the UK is headed. 
The Chinese ambassador warned that the decision comes at a “crucial historical juncture” 
and China hopes Britain retains its openness.  
The relationship is at a critical juncture in any case. Brexit throws into question Britain’s 
relationship with the EU. And China would want to maintain good relations with its largest 
export market, the EU, while at the same time work with Britain which is a more welcoming 
hub in the West than America.  
Besides, nuclear energy is a strategic sector that usually warrants additional scrutiny. The 
new UK government doing so shouldn’t come as a surprise, and Britain approved the deal 
once again. Still, China was watching to see if this is an isolated incident in the new post-
Brexit UK. As will many other countries. 
For Britain, convincing its trading partners and businesses that Brexit is not a rejection of 
globalization will be key. In its favour is Britain’s long history of being open to trade and 
international investment discussed earlier. The UK’s internationalist outlook has 
undoubtedly contributed to its position as the world’s fifth biggest economy with a 
relatively small population of 63 million. Pursuing free trade deals will be the clearest signal 
that Britain retains that outlook despite voting to leave the world’s biggest economic bloc.  
Britain will also need to convince its potential FTA partners such as China that the Brexit 
vote will not change its course. 
There has been some backlash against economic globalization that figured in the Brexit 
vote. A bit ironically, leaving the EU has led to an aggressive push to agree more free trade 
deals to secure Britain’s economic future.  
In any case, continuing global integration will be important for the UK’s economic growth. 
The challenge will not just be in agreeing on deals quickly, but how Britain will compete in a 
world where major economies are pushing for regional trading blocs just as the UK is leaving 
one.  
There’s no doubt that Britain’s future is uncertain, but its long-standing global orientation 
will help to overcome the concern that Brexit is a statement against globalization. 
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